The publications listed here represent a small selection of the work of GCILS staff members. To see full listings of publications please click through to the University of Glasgow main webpages in each individual staff member profile.
The traditional concepts of democracy are challenged by the change in the forms and concepts of the state as well as by the acceleration of European integration and the increased significance of international legal regimes. The purpose of this volume is to study the importance of both developments for legal models of democracy.
Since 2008 increasing pirate activities in Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean have once again drawn the international community's attention to piracy and armed robbery at sea. States are resolved to repress these impediments to the free flow of trade and navigation. To this end, a number of multinational counter-piracy missions have been deployed to the region. This book describes the enforcement powers that States may rely upon in their quest to repress piracy in the larger Gulf of Aden region. The piracy rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the legal safeguards applicable to maritime interception operations are scrutinized before the analysis turns to the criminal prosecution of pirates and armed robbers at sea. The discussion includes so-called shiprider agreements, the transfers of alleged offenders to regional states, the jurisdictional bases for prosecuting pirates, and the feasibility of an international(ized) venue for their trial. In addressing a range of relevant issues, this book presents a detailed and comprehensive up-to-date analysis of the legal issues pertaining to the repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea and assesses whether the currently existing legal regime is still adequate to effectively counter piracy in the 21st century.
In der gegenwärtigen analytischen Rechtsphilosophie wird die Debatte um die Objektivität des Rechts von reduktionistischen und metaphysischen Auffassungen dominiert, die oft in eine Sackgasse führen. Anders als diese Strategien greift der Autor in seiner Darstellung auf das begriffliche Arsenal der modernen analytischen Ontologie zurück. Rechtsnormen werden als abstrakte Entitäten aufgefasst, die innerhalb von semantischen Strukturen vorkommen. So gelingt es ihm, die Unergiebigkeit reduktionistischer und metaphysischer Positionen der Objektivität zu vermeiden, auch wenn die normative Natur des Rechts hierdurch noch nicht erklärt wird. Letzteres erfolgt durch den Nachweis, dass die genannten semantischen Strukturen argumentativer Natur sind. Dazu greift der Verfasser auf die Diskurs- und Argumentationstheorie des Rechts zurück und zeigt, dass die ontologische Struktur des Rechts dank dessen argumentativer bzw. diskursiver Natur auf die Sprachpragmatik zurückgeführt werden kann. Diese verweist auf eine grundlegende Autonomienorm kantischen Charakters, die aus den Grundvoraussetzungen der Argumentation abgeleitet werden kann. Auf diese Weise lässt sich zeigen, dass die Ontologie des Rechts, und mithin seine Objektivität, auf den formal-moralischen Gehalt einer Autonomiegrundnorm angewiesen ist.
In the long-standing debate between positivism and non-positivism, legal validity has always been a subject of controversy. While positivists deny that moral values play any role in the determination of legal validity, non-positivists affirm the opposite thesis. In departing from this narrow point of view, the book focuses on the notion of legal knowledge. Apart from what one takes to constitute the grounds of legal validity, there is a more fundamental issue about cognitive validity: how do we acquire knowledge of whatever is assumed to constitute the elements of legal validity? When the question is posed in this form a fundamental shift takes place. Given that knowledge is a philosophical concept, for anything to constitute an adequate ground for legal validity it must satisfy the standards set by knowledge. In exploring those standards the author argues that knowledge is the outcome of an activity of judging, which is constrained by reasons (reflexive). While these reasons may vary with the domain of judging, the reflexive structure of the practice of judging imposes certain constraints on what can constitute a reason for judging. Amongst these constraints are found not only general metaphysical limitations but also the fundamental principle that one with the capacity to judge is autonomous or, in other words, capable of determining the reasons that form the basis of action. One sees, as soon as autonomy has been introduced into the parameters of knowledge, that law is necessarily connected with every other practical domain. The author shows, in the end, that the issue of knowledge is orthogonal to questions about the inclusion or exclusion of morality, for what really matters is whether the putative grounds of legal validity are appropriate to the generation of knowledge. The outcome is far more integral than much work in current theory: neither an absolute deference to either universal moral standards or practice-independent values nor a complete adherence to conventionality and institutional arrangements will do. In suggesting that the current positivism versus non-positivism debate, when it comes to determining law's nature, misses the crux of the matter, the book aims to provoke a fertile new debate in legal theory.