The recent prevalence of high-profile unilateral treaty withdrawals raises broader questions over trust in treaty-making. Given the foundational importance of trust in treaties to international law, these withdrawals present risks to the international legal order generally. The issue for international law is how it can regulate treaty withdrawal in a way that preserves trust in the international legal system. The problem of trust is twofold. If international law adopts too permissive a stance towards unilateral withdrawal, then this will undermine trust in the binding force of treaties: pacta sunt servanda. If it is too restrictive, it will undermine the authority of international law, since it will result in situations in which recalcitrant States (ie States which have decided no longer to comply with their obligations) disobey, and are seen to disobey, their obligations. The paper seeks to explore this tension that underlies the regulation of treaty withdrawal. First, it analyses historical approaches to the problem, and, second, how the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has sought to resolve it. It then examines how the principle is and can be used to achieve a balance between integrity and authority that can assist international law in regulating withdrawal and recalcitrance in a manner that preserves trust in treaty-making.

In Brownlie v Four Seasons Holdings Inc, the UK Supreme Court for the first time addressed the meaning of ‘damage’ in the gateway for jurisdiction in tort cases under paragraph 3.1(9)(a) of Practice Direction 6B of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. The issue has proven controversial with a number of first instance decisions asserting an expansive jurisdiction in such cases, departing from the traditional approach. In the event the Court decided the case on other grounds, but the extensive discussion of the issue (on which the Court was divided 3-2) illustrates the stark divergence of opinion on the proper scope of and approach to the English courts’ adjudicatory authority. This note criticises the views advanced by the majority for endorsing the more expansive interpretation on the grounds that it fails to take account of the legislative history and applies an incomplete conception of justice in justifying its position.